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The War Powers Resolution—A 
Dim and Fading Legacy 
John R. Crook* 
The 1973 War Powers Resolution, adopted over the veto of 
a weakened President Nixon after the Vietnam War, has not 
fulfilled its supporters’ hope of a stronger Congressional role in 
decisions involving U.S. uses of force. No administration has 
accepted its key provisions’ constitutionality, and Congress has 
been unwilling or unable to perform the role it set for itself of 
approving or terminating the introduction of U.S. forces into 
hostilities.  Hence, the Resolution has had only modest impact.  
Despite occasional debates regarding compliance, it has not 
materially affected successive presidents’ decisions to use force.   
It seems likely to have less impact in the future, given 
Congress’s broad authorization for the use of force following the 
9/11 attacks and the changing nature of warfare, including the 
growing role of non-military actors, cyber warfare and other 
new forms of conflict, secret operations, and remotely piloted 
weapons.   
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I. Introduction 
I begin with a disclaimer. I am not a scholar of constitutional or 
national security law. For thirty years, I was employed in various 
legal capacities by the U.S. Department of State. Since then, I have 
edited the American Journal of International Law’s section on 
Contemporary U.S. Practice Related to International Law for many 
* John R. Crook is an arbitrator in NAFTA and other investment 
disputes and served on the Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission. He is 
Vice-President of the American Society of International Law and former 
General Counsel of the Multinational Force and Observers, the 
peacekeeping force in the Sinai. He teaches international arbitration at 
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years. I was also a military police lieutenant in the early 1970s, in a 
U.S. Army badly scarred by its long and painful experience in 
Vietnam.1  Thus, I am familiar with debates about the War Powers 
Resolution.2 All this has left me with a generally “pro-executive” bias 
in the recurring debates about the proper roles of Congress and the 
executive in national security matters. 
I will not try to add to the discussion on the constitutional 
propriety of the War Powers Resolution, nor will I do much lawyerly 
parsing of the text. Instead, I will briefly describe how the Resolution 
has had only a modest impact over the last forty years and then 
suggest why I think it is likely to have even less significance going 
forward.  
The War Powers Resolution was the offspring of an increasingly 
unpopular war and an increasingly unpopular presidency.3 As 
Professor Stephen L. Carter observed, it was “forced on a weakened 
President Nixon by a Congress brimming with confidence in the wake 
of the Watergate scandals.”4 Consider the timeline:  
March 1971—The approval rating for U.S. Vietnam policy 
dropped to 41%, and approximately half of all Americans 
polled thought the war was “morally wrong.”5 First 
Lieutenant William Calley was convicted of murdering 
twenty-two civilians at My Lai by a court martial.  
June 1972—The Watergate burglary. 
January 23, 1973—Paris Peace Accords signed. 
January 27, 1973—Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird 
announced the end of the draft. 
Spring 1973—The Watergate hearings began.  
1. See MARVIN KALB & DEBORAH KALB, HAUNTING LEGACY: VIETNAM AND 
THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY FROM FORD TO OBAMA 88–91 (2011). 
2. Pub. L. No. 93–148, 87 Stat. 555 (1973) (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§1541–
48).  
3. See Michael J. Glennon, Too Far Apart: Repeal the War Powers 
Resolution, 50 U. MIAMI L. REV. 17, 18 (1996). 
4. Stephen L. Carter, The Constitutionality of the War Powers Resolution, 
70 VA. L. REV. 101, 102 (1984).  
5. See Joseph Carroll, The Iraq-Vietnam Comparison, GALLUP (June 15, 
2004), http://www.gallup.com/poll/11998/iraqvietnam-comparison.aspx; 
Anne Gearan, AP-GfK Poll: Afghan War Support Drops to New Low, 
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June 1973—Congress approves the Case-Church Amendment by 
wide margins, barring further military involvement in Vietnam, 
Laos, and Cambodia. 
October 1973—Vice President Spiro Agnew resigned and 
pleaded guilty to criminal charges. 
November 7, 1973—The War Powers Resolution was passed 
over President Nixon’s veto. 
May 1974—Congress began impeachment proceedings.  
August 9, 1974—President Nixon resigned.  
The War Powers Resolution is the product of a time when 
Congress was riding particularly high and the presidency was 
particularly weak.6 That unusual array of circumstances has not been 
repeated. In the ensuing years, no administration has accepted the 
constitutionality of the Resolution’s key provisions.7 At the other end 
of Pennsylvania Avenue, Congress has not mustered the collective will 
to insist on full and timely compliance with the Resolution in a wide 
range of cases.8 From time to time, the Resolution has offered both 
Republican and Democratic presidents’ political opponents an avenue 
to attack their compliance with particular policies or actions. 
Nevertheless, Congress has not shown itself willing or able to perform 
the role it set out for itself in Section 5 of the Resolution.9  
6. See PETER W. RODMAN, PRESIDENTIAL COMMAND: POWER, LEADERSHIP, 
AND THE MAKING OF FOREIGN POLICY FROM RICHARD NIXON TO GEORGE 
W. BUSH 113–14 (2009). 
7. During the Carter Administration, the Office of the Legal Counsel 
suggested in a paragraph that the Resolution’s 60-day time limit passed 
constitutional muster. This view has not been repeated. See Presidential 
Power to Use the Armed Forces Abroad Without Statutory 
Authorization, 4A Op. O.L.C. 185, 196 (1980).  
8. See John Hart Ely, Suppose Congress Wanted a War Powers Act That 
Worked, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1379, 1380–83 (1988); Eileen Burgin, 
Congress, the War Powers Resolution & the Invasion of Panama, 25 
POLITY 217, 217 (1992). 
9. Section 5(b) provides that, on receiving a presidential report that U.S. 
forces are being introduced into a situation involving actual or imminent 
involvement in hostilities, those forces must be withdrawn unless within 
sixty days, Congress declares war, specifically authorizes their use, 
extends the sixty-day period, or cannot meet because of an armed attack 
on the United States.  
 Section 5(c) provides that if U.S. armed forces are engaged in hostilities 
outside the United States without a declaration of war or specific 
congressional authorization, they shall be removed if Congress so directs 
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II. The Resolution in Practice 
For the details of the often intricate interplay between Congress 
and various presidents under the Resolution, the best starting point is 
the detailed studies of past practice prepared by the Congressional 
Research Service of the Library of Congress.10 In the forty years since 
the Resolution was adopted over President Nixon’s veto, there have 
been at least 136 reports filed “consistent with” the Resolution.11 Only 
one, President Ford’s report on the deployment of U.S. forces to 
recover the SS Mayaguez twelve days after the fall of Saigon in 1975, 
specifically stated that forces had been introduced into hostilities or 
imminent hostilities.12 
While debates regarding compliance (or non-compliance) with the 
Resolution have arisen from time to time, the Resolution has not 
materially affected successive presidents’ use-of-force decisions. I know 
of no case where a president, Republican or Democratic, refrained 
from utilizing U.S. military force solely because of the Resolution. In 
the forty years since its enactment, presidents of both parties have 
utilized U.S. forces in response to a wide array of challenges. I believe 
that, at most, the Resolution has affected these actions at the 
margins.  
Successive presidents’ uses of military force have been too 
numerous to detail here. There were few incidents involving use of 
U.S. forces on President Carter’s watch, except for the failed raid to 
free hostages from Iran in 1980.13 President Reagan sent U.S. forces to 
Lebanon in 1982,14 contending that the circumstances did not 
constitute hostilities while also insisting that the Resolution was 
unconstitutional.15 As Professor Turner describes, this deployment of 
U.S. forces was unpopular in Congress and led to a rare instance of 
congressional action under Article 5 of the Resolution.16  
President). See H.R.J. Res. 542, Pub. L. 93-148, § 5(b)–(c), 87 Stat. 555 
(1973) (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541–1548). 
10. See, e.g., RICHARD F. GRIMMETT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41199, THE 
WAR POWERS RESOLUTION AFTER THIRTY-SIX YEARS (2010); RICHARD 
F. GRIMMETT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33532, WAR POWERS 
RESOLUTION: PRESIDENTIAL COMPLIANCE (2012) [hereinafter GRIMMETT, 
PRESIDENTIAL COMPLIANCE]. 
11. GRIMMETT, PRESIDENTIAL COMPLIANCE, supra note 10, summary.  
12. See id. On the Mayaguez, see KALB & KALB, supra note 1, 29–40.  
13. See KALB & KALB, supra note 1, 70–74. 
14. Id. at 95; Ely, supra note 8, at 1381. 
15. Carter, supra note 4, at 105.  
16. See Exercising Congress’s Constitutional Power to End a War (Without 
in Process Breaking the Law): Hearing Exercising Congress’s 
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Faced with strong congressional resistance, the Reagan 
Administration and Congress struck a deal: the president did not 
concede the Resolution’s constitutionality, but did sign a joint 
resolution authorizing U.S. Marines to remain for eighteen months for 
limited purposes and subject to reporting requirements.17 The deal 
was an uneasy one; Reagan’s signing statement records his 
disagreement with Congress’s determination that the War Powers 
Resolution had been triggered, arguing that “the initiation of isolated 
or infrequent acts of violence against United States Armed Forces 
does not necessarily constitute actual or imminent involvement in 
hostilities, even if casualties to those forces result.”18   
President Reagan withdrew U.S. forces from Lebanon before the 
end of the eighteen-month deployment after 241 Marines were killed 
in the October 23, 1983 bombing of their Beirut barracks.19 Although 
the United States had clear intelligence identifying the perpetrators of 
the bombing, the president did not order military action against 
them.20 During Reagan’s second term, the deployment of U.S. naval 
forces in the Persian Gulf (which included direct conflicts with Iranian 
forces) led more than 100 members of Congress to sue in pursuit of 
compliance with the Resolution; their action was dismissed on 
equitable and political question grounds.21 This was one of several 
unsuccessful actions brought by members of Congress during the 
Judiciary 110th Cong. 249–50 (2007) (prepared statement of Prof. 
Robert F. Turner).  
17. Multinational Force in Lebanon Resolution, Pub. L. No 98–119, 97 Stat. 
805. Section 2(b) of the resolution recites a congressional determination 
that the presidential reporting requirement of section 4(a)(1) was 
operative: that is, that U.S. forces had been introduced into a situation 
of hostilities or imminent hostilities. The resolution then describes the 
authorization for continued presence of U.S. forces as “[c]onsistent with 
section 5(b) of the War Powers Resolution.” On the deployment of U.S. 
forces to Lebanon, see Carter, supra note 4, at 105; KALB & KALB, supra 
note 1, at 103; RODMAN, supra note 6, 170–73.  
18. Statement on Signing Multinational Force in Lebanon Resolution Into 
Law, S.J. Res. 159, Oct. 12, 1983, 22 I.L.M. 1391. 
19. See RODMAN, supra note 6, at 170–73. The author was at risk of 
becoming another casualty on the night of the Beirut bombing, when he 
and a new, nervous, and fast drawing Marine Security Guard corporal 
had an unexpected encounter in the basement of the U.S. Embassy in 
The Hague.  
20. See KALB & KALB, supra note 1, at 92–96, 104–11. 
21. Lowry v. Reagan, 676 F. Supp. 333, 334 (D.D.C. 1987); see also Monroe 
Leigh, Judicial Decisions, 82 AM. J. INT’L L. 580, 596 (1988) 
(summarizing Lowry v. Reagan).  
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Reagan years invoking the War Powers Resolution. All of these cases 
were dismissed on preliminary grounds,22 as have other cases since.  
The October 1983 U.S. invasion of Grenada23 occurred at almost 
the same time as the Beirut bombing. The invasion offers an 
interesting illustration of how the Resolution can suddenly become 
less relevant when a president takes military action with broad public 
support. While most U.S. troops had left the island by the sixty-day 
deadline, a few remained, but there was little congressional inclination 
to make an issue of it.24 
President George H.W. Bush’s December 1989 invasion of 
Panama and the removal of General Noriega from power also seem to 
have been popular with the U.S. public and with members of 
Congress25—sufficiently popular to muffle any congressional concerns 
involving the War Powers Resolution. Although the invasion involved 
a large-scale deployment of U.S. forces into a situation involving 
firefights and U.S. casualties and was effected with little or no prior 
congressional consultation, Congress essentially remained silent. 
“[T]he administration’s failure to abide by the law was almost never 
addressed publicly following the Panama invasion. Members 
introduced neither reactive legislation about Panama and the [War 
Powers Resolution] nor prospective proposals about the act.”26 
President Bush sent U.S. troops into Somalia at the end of 1992 
for what was to have been a short-duration humanitarian mission, but 
it dragged on into the Clinton years, leading to the bloody October 
1993 raid on General Aidid’s headquarters, later memorialized in the 
book and film Black Hawk Down.27 Thereafter, Congress enacted 
closely circumscribed authorizations for U.S. troops to remain for five 
months for limited force protection purposes.28 Following its unhappy 
experiences in Somalia, the Clinton Administration was, for a time at 
22. See Lori Fisler Damrosch, The Clinton Administration and War Powers, 
63 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 125, 130 n.32 (2000). 
23. See KALB & KALB, supra note 1, at 92–94. 
24. See Carter, supra note 4, at 106–07. 
25. See Jane Kellett Cramer, “Just Cause” or Just Politics?: U.S. Panama 
Invasion and Standardizing Qualitative Tests for Diversionary War, 32 
ARMED FORCES & SOC’Y 178, 194–95 (2006) (stating that “[a]fter the 
invasion, there was clear bipartisan support for President Bush’s use of 
force” and “80 percent U.S. approval”). 
26. Burgin, supra note 8, at 233.   
27. See Michael Wines, Mission to Somalia; Bush Declares Goal in Somalia 
to ‘Save Thousands,’ N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 1992, at 1.  
28. Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 1994, Pub. L. No. 103–139, 
§ 8151, 107 Stat. 1418; National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 
Year 1994, Pub. L. No. 103–160, § 1512, 107 Stat. 1547. See also KALB 
& KALB, supra note 1, at 169–71.  
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least, very cautious about uses of force. Informed observers attribute 
the U.S. failure to respond to the Rwandan genocide in April and 
May of 1994 to the legacy of the unsuccessful U.S. military efforts in 
Somalia.29 Other uses of force during the Clinton Administration in 
Iraq, Haiti, Sudan, and elsewhere, and the administration’s approach 
to the War Powers Resolution (which broadly tracked that of earlier 
administrations), have been well summarized elsewhere, notably by 
Professor Lori Damrosch.30 Only one warrants further mention here: 
President Clinton’s substantial use of American air power as part of 
the NATO bombing campaign intended to end the ethnic cleansing of 
Kosovars by Serbian force in the spring of 1999—an air campaign 
that continued well past the Resolution’s sixty-day deadline.31 
Congress was unable to agree either to approve or disapprove the 
bombing campaign.32 As Clinton’s frustrated spokesman put it, “The 
House today voted no on going forward, no on going back and they 
tied on standing still.”33  
President George W. Bush engaged in extensive use of military 
force, including large-scale ground wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, both 
of which were blessed by Congress.34 The legislation involved is 
discussed below.  
The Resolution became the focus of debate again in the spring 
and early summer of 2011, as President Obama committed U.S. air 
and naval forces as part of the successful multilateral military effort 
that accompanied the fall from power of Libyan dictator Muammar 
Qaddafi.35 The administration contended that the use of American 
military power in these circumstances did not trigger Article 4 of the 
Resolution,36 requiring a report from the president whenever U.S. 
29. See KALB & KALB, supra note 1, at 172.  
30. See generally Damrosch, supra note 22.  
31. See JOHN YOO, THE POWERS OF WAR AND PEACE: THE CONSTITUTION 
AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS AFTER 9/11, at 157–59 (2005). 
32. Damrosch, supra note 22, at 137–38. 
33. Charles Babington & Juliet Eilperin, House Votes to Require Assent for 
Ground Troops, WASH. POST, Apr. 29, 1999, at A1. 
34. See Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 
2002, Pub. L. No. 1107–243, 116 Stat. 1498; Authorization for Use of 
Military Force 2001, Pub. L. No. 107–40, 115 Stat. 224. 
35. Jessica Rettig, Obama, Congress Not Likely to Engage on Libya Yet, 
U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REP., May 18, 2011, http://www.usnews.com/ 
news/articles/2011/05/18/obama-congress-not-likely-to-engage-on-libya-
yet (discussing President Obama’s use of military action “in line with 
the War Powers Resolution” in Libya).  
36. See JOSEPH E. MACMANUS, DEP’T OF DEF. & ELIZABETH L. KING, DEP’T 
OF STATE, UNITED STATES ACTIVITIES IN LIBYA 25 (2011), available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/documents/united-
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armed forces are introduced “into hostilities, or into situations where 
imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the 
circumstances.”37 In June 2011 testimony before the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee, State Department Legal Adviser Harold Koh 
identified four factors said to indicate that the Libyan operation did 
not constitute “hostilities” for purposes of Section 4. Koh emphasized 
the limited scope of the mission, the limited exposure of U.S. armed 
forces, the limited risk of escalation, and the limited military means 
involved.38  
Some analysts and commentators excoriated the administration’s 
legal rationale;39 others found it sufficient.40 As has often occurred in 
cases involving the Resolution, Congress could not decide on a course 
of action. In June 2011, the House of Representatives rejected a 
resolution authorizing the limited use of the U.S. Armed Forces in 
support of the NATO operation in Libya by a vote of 123 yeas to 295 
nays.41 However, it also rejected a second resolution limiting the use 
of appropriated funds to support the NATO operation by a vote of 
180 yeas to 238 nays.42 Following the success of the Libyan 
insurrection, the death of Qaddafi, and the end of the NATO air 
campaign, congressional interest in the Resolution’s application to 
Libya appears to have dropped off sharply. 
constitutional authority to direct “limited military operations abroad,” 
as U.S. military forces “are playing a constrained and supporting role in 
a legitimated multinational coalition” and “do not involve sustained 
fighting or active exchanges of fire with hostile forces” with no 
“significant chance of escalation into a conflict . . . .”). 
37. H.R.J. Res. 542, Pub. L. 93-148, § 2(a), 87 Stat. 555 (1973) (codified at 
50 U.S.C. §§ 1541–1548). 
38. See Libya and War Powers: Hearing Before the S. Comm. On Foreign 
Rel., 112th Cong. 14–16 (2011) (testimony of Harold Hongju Koh, Legal 
Adviser, U.S. Dep’t of State) (noting, among other things, that there 
had been no U.S. casualties, and U.S. forces were not involved in “active 
exchanges of fire with hostile forces” and that “the bulk of U.S. 
contributions to the NATO effort has been providing intelligence 
capabilities and refueling assets”). 
39. See, e.g., Libya and War Powers: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on 
Foreign Rel., 112th Cong. 42 (2011) (statement of Louis Fisher, Scholar 
in Residence, The Constitution Project).  
40. See, e.g., Libya and War Powers: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on 
Foreign Rel., 112th Cong. 1 (2011) (statement of Peter J. Spiro, 
Professor of Law, Temple Univ., Beasley School of Law) (“The [Obama] 
Administration’s interpretation of ‘hostilities’ under the War Powers 
Resolution is a plausible one, although not free from doubt.”). 
41. 157 CONG. REC. H4534 (daily ed. June 24, 2011). 
42. GRIMMETT, PRESIDENTIAL COMPLIANCE, supra note 10, at 14. 
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Although successive presidents have not sought express 
congressional authorization for smaller-scale military operations, 
Presidents George H.W. Bush and George W. Bush sought and 
obtained congressional authorization for the three largest U.S. wars 
since Vietnam. The public record does not indicate that the War 
Powers Resolution was a factor in these decisions. Rather, they seem 
to have been impelled by political judgments, likely informed by the 
Vietnam experience and by a sense of constitutional necessity, that 
both political branches have a necessary role in decisions to 
committing the nation to large-scale hostilities.  
President George H.W. Bush’s extensive commitment of U.S. 
forces in the First Gulf War received congressional sanction, but it 
came five months after the massive buildup of U.S. forces in the Gulf 
began. While President Bush later remarked that he did not need 
“permission from some old goat in the United States Congress to kick 
Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait,”43 he nevertheless sought 
congressional approval. In January 1991 Congress approved the 
Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 
199144 authorizing U.S. combat operations against Iraqi forces. The 
resolution, which stated that it constituted specific statutory 
authorization within the meaning of the War Powers Resolution, 
passed the House by a vote of 250–183.45 Passage was a closer run 
thing in the Senate, where the vote was 52–47.46 
The second President Bush also sought and received congressional 
approval for the U.S. invasion of Iraq. Again, it does not seem that 
the War Powers Resolution figured in the decision to go to 
Congress.47 In October 2002, Congress approved the Authorization for 
Use of Military Force Against Iraq, authorizing the president to use 
force as he determines necessary to “defend the national security of 
43. Remarks of President George Bush, 28 WKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1120–
21 (1992). 
44. H.R.J. Res. 77, 102d Cong. (1991). In a signing statement, President 
Bush indicated that he did not concede the War Powers Resolution’s 
constitutionality. See also L. Gordon Crovitz, How Bush Outflanked 
Iraq and Liberated the Constitution, WALL ST. J., Mar. 6, 1991, at A9. 
45. KALB & KALB, supra note 1, at 147. 
46. Id.   
47. See BOB WOODWARD, PLAN OF ATTACK 168–70, 200–04 (2004). 
Woodward contends that President Bush would likely have used U.S. 
forces regardless of Congressional authorization, but that Vice President 
Richard Cheney proposed that “the president . . . demand a quick 
passage of a resolution so voters would know before the election where 
every congressman and senator stood on Saddam Hussein and his 
dangerous regime.” Id. at 168–69.  
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the United States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq” and to 
enforce relevant U.N. Security Council Resolutions.48  
Congress also gave legislative sanction for the war in Afghanistan 
and many other uses of military force in combatting terrorism. In 
September 2001, a week after the September 11, 2001 attacks on the 
World Trade Center and the Pentagon, Congress hurriedly passed the 
ultimate of all authorizations for the use of force. The Authorization 
for Use of Military Force Resolution49 (AUMF) has provided statutory 
underpinning for uses of American forces in many conflicts in many 
places for the last eleven years. The AUMF’s authorization for the use 
of U.S. forces is very broad: 
(2)(a) IN GENERAL—That the President is authorized to use 
all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, 
organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, 
committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on 
September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, 
in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism 
against the United States by such nations, organizations or 
persons.50 
The AUMF’s drafters made clear that they intended for the 
legislation to satisfy the Resolution’s requirement of congressional 
approval for deploying U.S. forces. Section 2(b)(1) provides: 
“Consistent with section 8(a)(1) of the War Powers Resolution, the 
Congress declares that this section is intended to constitute specific 
statutory authorization within the meaning of section 5(b) of the War 
Powers Resolution.”51 
Thus, in the forty years since the War Powers Resolution was 
adopted, it has rarely had significant effect on national security policy 
and the use of U.S. forces. Congress has rarely turned its mind to the 
Resolution. When it has, the debate often has veered to issues of 
technical compliance with the Resolution, not to the wisdom of 
particular policies involving actual or potential uses of force. Indeed, 
it often has worked out that whichever political party does not hold 
the presidency has invoked the Resolution as an avenue to attack 
actions taken by a president of the other party.  
48. Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002, 
Pub. L. No. 107–243, 116 Stat. 1498.  
49. Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 [hereinafter AUMF]. The AUMF was 
adopted by a vote of 420-1 in the House of Representatives and 98-0 in 
the Senate. See generally Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, 
Congressional Authorization and the War on Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. 
REV. 2047 (2005).  
50. AUMF, supra note 49, § 2.  
51. Id. § 2(b)(1) 
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In the meantime, successive administrations have adopted the 
practice of submitting periodic reports “consistent with the War 
Powers Resolution” briefly describing deployments of U.S. forces 
“equipped for combat” at many locations throughout the world. The 
unclassified versions of these reports are a useful contribution to 
transparency. The classified versions may provide additional 
information of value to lawmakers. However, the reports seem a 
modest legacy.  
III. What of the Future? 
Yogi Berra is credited with observing that it is difficult to predict 
the future because you don’t know what’s going to happen. On this, 
as with many things, Yogi was correct. We do not know what may 
occur in Syria, the South China Sea, Iran, or any of the world’s other 
potential flashpoints for military confrontations. Nevertheless, I 
believe it is reasonably safe to predict that the War Powers 
Resolution will have less relevance in coming years than it has in the 
past. Several factors point this way. 
A. The Continued Role of the AUMF   
The first factor is Congress’s approval in 2001 of the AUMF, 
which remains in force and seems likely to remain with us for the 
foreseeable future. It will be a bold president or congressman who 
announces that the “War on Terror” has been won and the AUMF 
should be repealed. The act’s broad terms played a central role in the 
U.S. Supreme Court’s affirmation of the president’s power to detain 
enemy combatants,52 and have provided statutory cover—for both 
political branches—with respect to a wide range of deployments of 
U.S. military forces in many places as part of the ongoing, violent, 
and often shadowy U.S. efforts against terrorists. The AUMF contains 
no limitations as to the forces that may be employed, potential 
targets, or geographical extent, and describes the enemy in expansive 
terms.53  
A commentator recently observed that “[t]he president who won 
the Nobel Peace Prize less than nine months after his inauguration 
has turned out to be one of the most militarily aggressive American 
leaders in decades.”54 Whether one accepts this characterization or 
not, it is clear that U.S. personnel and assets are being widely and 
lethally applied in many parts of the globe for the purposes indicated 
in the AUMF. The most recent consolidated War Powers report sent 
52. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 510 (2004). See also Bradley & 
Goldsmith, supra note 49, at 2052–53.  
53. See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 49, at 2080–82.  
54. Peter L. Bergen, Warrior in Chief, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 2012, at SR1. 
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by President Obama to congressional leaders on June 20, 2012 
describes a wide range of military deployments and activities, 
including public confirmation of previously unconfirmed U.S. military 
operations against groups affiliated with al-Qaeda in Somalia and 
Yemen.55 Most of the listed activities seem to have been undertaken 
under the AUMF umbrella. The unclassified report states: 
Since October 7, 2001, the United States has conducted combat 
operations in Afghanistan against al-Qa’ida terrorists, their 
Taliban supporters, and associated forces. In support of these 
and other overseas operations, the United States has deployed 
combat equipped forces to a number of locations in the U.S. 
Central, Pacific, European, Southern, and Africa Command 
areas of operation. Previously such operations and deployments 
have been reported, consistent with Public Law 107-40 [the 
AUMF] and the War Powers Resolution, and operations and 
deployments remain ongoing. 56 
The report goes on to briefly describe military activities involving 
combat-equipped U.S. forces in Afghanistan, Central African 
Republic, Cuba (Guantánamo Bay), Democratic Republic of the 
Congo, Egypt, Iraq, Kosovo, Somalia, South Sudan, Uganda, and 
Yemen. The report also refers to additional activities described in its 
classified annex. 
B. The Changing Nature of Warfare  
The second factor weighing against the Resolution’s relevance is 
the changing nature of warfare. The United States’ means and 
methods of warfare, and its potential opponents, are quite different 
from those Congress had in mind in 1973. 
It is said that generals prepare for the last war. The War Powers 
Resolution suggests that legislators do the same. The Resolution’s 
draftsmen had their eyes on the U.S. Vietnam experience of 1965–
1972, when large conventional forces built on a steady supply of 
draftees were caught in a massive, long-running, and increasingly 
unpopular war fought most visibly on the ground. Thus, the 
Resolution’s trigger is the introduction of “United States Armed 
Forces”57 into “hostilities, or into situations where imminent 
55. Peter Baker, Obama Acknowledges U.S. Is Fighting Groups Tied to Al 
Qaeda in Somalia and Yemen, N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 2012, at A9.  
56. Press Release, President Barack Obama, Presidential Leader—2012 War 
Powers Resolution 6-Month Report (June 15, 2012), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/06/15/presidential-
letter-2012-war-powers-resolution-6-month-report. 
57. 10 U.S.C. § 101(a)(4) defines the term “armed forces” to mean “the 
Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard.” 
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involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances.”58 
The Resolution’s focus and wording don’t match many contemporary 
realities. 
Analysis of the profound changes in the ways in which the United 
States utilizes force is far beyond the scope of this article. However, 
brief mention of a few of the changes is illustrative:  
• Non-military actors: The United States is greatly increasing 
use of non-military actors—including the Central 
Intelligence Agency and civilian contractors59—in 
conducting operations involving the use of force and in 
collecting intelligence in potentially dangerous locations. It 
is widely reported that the extensive attacks on suspected 
Taliban locations in remote regions of Pakistan and 
elsewhere involve remotely piloted aircraft controlled by the 
CIA, not by “U.S. Armed Forces.”60 The U.S. military is 
also reportedly using civilian contractors to gather 
intelligence in support of low-visibility U.S. military 
operations in Africa.61 Such activities by civilians do not fall 
under terms of the War Powers Resolution. Some operations 
reportedly involve combinations of CIA and military 
resources.62 
• New styles of conflict: New types of conflict are emerging 
that again do not mesh with the Resolution’s structure and 
concepts. According to multiple reports, U.S. agencies and 
personnel played significant roles in developing and 
deploying computer malware that successfully disabled 
nearly 1000 centrifuges in Iran’s nuclear enrichment 
facilities.63 The response in Congress has not been concern 
that it was not informed of the U.S. attack, or that the 
United States might be implicated in actions potentially 
constituting an armed attack on Iran. Instead, 
58. H.R.J. Res. 542, Pub. L. 93-148, § 2(a), 87 Stat. 555 (1973) (codified at 
50 U.S.C. §§ 1541–1548). 
59. See LAURA A. DICKINSON, OUTSOURCING WAR AND PEACE: PRESERVING 
PUBLIC VALUES IN A WORLD OF PRIVATIZED FOREIGN AFFAIRS 4 (2011).  
60. See, e.g., Declan Walsh & Eric Schmitt, Al Qaeda’s No. 2 Said to Be 
Killed in a Drone Strike, N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 2012, at A1.  
61. See Craig Whitlock, Contractors Run U.S. Spying Missions in Africa, 
WASH. POST, June 14, 2012, at A1.  
62. See Greg Miller, Under Obama, a Drone Network, WASH. POST, Dec. 28, 
2011, at A1.  
63. See David Sanger, Obama Order Sped Up Wave of Cyberattacks Against 
Iran, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 2012, at A1; Ellen Nakashima & Joby 
Warrick, Officials Say U.S., Israel Were Behind Cyberattack on Iran, 
WASH. POST, June 2, 2012, at A2.  
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Congressional reaction has focused on the possible leak of 
classified information, with Republican members of 
Congress charging that sensitive material was leaked for 
partisan advantage.64  
• Secret operations: As the foregoing illustrates, the United 
States’ contemporary uses of force are often shrouded in 
secrecy, largely insulating them from informed public 
discussion and congressional consideration, save perhaps for 
a few members of a few key congressional committees. 
Thus, for example, the United States is reported to have 
created a ring of classified bases from which Joint Special 
Operations Command personnel operate remotely piloted 
aircraft in the Horn of Africa and the Arabian Peninsula.65   
It is striking in this regard that press reports of President 
Obama’s personal involvement in decisions to target 
suspected terrorists66 have not led to congressional 
consideration whether it is appropriate for this president—or 
any president—to play such a role in targeting individuals.67 
Rather, the focus in Congress has again been that details 
were leaked for allegedly partisan purposes.  
• Remotely piloted weaponry: U.S. armed forces today make 
extensive and increasing use of weapons systems that do not 
expose U.S. personnel to danger from enemy action, most 
notably remotely piloted aircraft and cruise missiles that 
can strike distant targets after being launched at sea or 
from distant aircraft. Targets in Afghanistan are regularly 
tracked and attacked by remotely piloted aircraft flown by 
Air Force controllers sitting at air bases in the continental 
United States. Indeed, remote piloting has become an 
64. See Senators to Open Inquiry Into ‘Kill List’ and Iran Security Leaks, 
N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 2012, at A12; Greg Miller, Intelligence Panels Seek 
New Laws on Classified Data, WASH. POST, June 7, 2012, at A3; Scott 
Shane, Renewing a Debate Over Secrecy, and Its Costs, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 7, 2012, at A1.  
65. See Mark Mazzetti & Eric Schmitt, U.S. Expands Its Drone War into 
Somalia, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 2011, at A1; Karen DeYoung, U.S. Air 
Attacks in Yemen Intensify, WASH. POST, Sept. 17, 2011, at A6; Craig 
Whitlock & Greg Miller, U.S. Creating A Ring of Secret Drone Bases, 
WASH. POST, Sept. 21, 2011, at A1.  
66. Jo Becker & Scott Shane, Secret ‘Kill List’ Proves a Test of Obama’s 
Principles and Will, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 2012, at A1.  
67. See Editorial, Too Much Power for a President, N.Y. TIMES, May 31, 
2012, at A28.  
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established career in the U.S. Air Force, with regular 
training and a designated career field.68  
Increasing use and reliance on such weapons, remotely piloted by 
U.S. military personnel physically located at safe locations in the 
United States—and not involving “boots on the ground”—do not 
mesh comfortably with the statutory notions of “introducing United 
States Armed Forces into hostilities.” In this regard, the fact that 
U.S. personnel involved in the NATO operation against Libya were 
physically well removed from the battles on the ground was a 
significant thread in the Obama Administration’s argument that those 
forces were not involved in hostilities for purposes of the Resolution.  
IV. Conclusion 
The War Powers Resolution has, at most, only influenced 
decisions involving the use of U.S. armed forces at the margins. It 
seems likely to have less impact going forward.  
So as Lenin famously asked, “what is to be done?” I don’t know 
the answer. Today’s political climate is harshly partisan. The political 
branches cannot come to reasonable accommodations on matters of 
far more immediate importance than revising the War Powers 
Resolution.69 Even in less partisan times, it is difficult to envision 
mechanisms for effective congressional-executive interaction in use-of-
force decisions that are both constitutionally appropriate and likely to 
stand up in the face of actual events. Past proposals for revision and 
reform have not made it past the starting line.70  
Our current inability to have a sensible conversation about the 
appropriate interplay between Congress and the president in matters 
involving the use of force is troubling. As noted here, there has been a 
blurring of many of the traditional boundaries that determine how the 
United States identifies its enemies and uses force against them. At 
the same time, there has been a profound shift in the makeup of the 
U.S. armed forces. The Vietnam-era draft made that war a central 
fact in the lives of millions of young men and their families, giving 
issues of war or peace immediacy that they do not have today. The 
United States now relies upon highly professional armed forces. While 
bumper stickers on civilians’ cars urge us to “support the troops,” 
those “troops” make up a tiny percentage of the population, living 
68. See Tech. Sgt. Amaani Lyle, Air Force Officials Announce Remotely 
Piloted Aircraft Pilot Training Pipeline, AIR FORCE PRINT NEWS TODAY 
(June 9, 2010), http://www.af.mil/news/story.asp?storyID=123208561.  
69. See, e.g., Steven Mufson & Lori Montgomery, Over the ‘Fiscal Cliff’ and 
into Recession?, WASH. POST, Aug. 23, 2012, at A1.  
70. See, e.g., Ely, supra note 8; Michael J. Glennon, The War Powers 
Resolution, Once Again, 103 AM. J. INT’L L. 75 (2009). 
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and performing their duties in a world separate and apart from most 
of us.71  
Together, these things may make it easier—perhaps too easy—for 
any president to decide to use force in doubtful circumstances. There 
is a need for an effective mechanism to better assure that such 
decisions are wise and will enjoy the support of the American people. 
Unfortunately, the War Powers Resolution is not that mechanism.   
  
 
71. By the Numbers: Today’s Military, NPR, Mar. 31, 2010, 
http://www.npr.org/2011/07/03/137536111/by-the-numbers-todays-
military (noting that less than 1% of the total U.S. population serves in 
the military today).  
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